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14.1  Introduction 
A public pension system can be viewed as an arrangement by  which the 
government issues IOUs to the currently working population, promising that a 
specified amount of benefits will be paid out in the future, in return for pension 
contributions. Under this  system, the  government accumulates a “pension 
debt” to the private sector. However, the balance of the existing pension fund 
represents the government’s loans to the private sector. Thus, the difference 
between the pension debt and the balance of the pension fund represents the 
net government debt to the private sector stemming from the pension system, 
hereafter called the “net pension debt.” 
The imaginary pension fund that would exist if a pension system had been 
started as a fully funded system is called the “full fund” of the pension system. 
The balance of the full fund is always equal to the pension debt of the govern- 
ment. Hence, we have 
(1)  Net pension debt = Full fund -  Actual pension fund. 
(Pension debt) 
II 
If a pension system were fully funded, the balance of the pension fund and 
the pension debt would be equal, and the net pension debt would be zero. In 
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1990, however, the net pension debt of the Japanese government exceeded the 
gross national product (GNP). In other words, the pension  debt was much 
larger than the balance of the pension fund. This difference was distributed to 
the following two groups: current and past retirees, whose benefits exceeded 
their contributions, and those current workers who had been promised benefits 
greater than their past contributions. In other words, the net pension debt has 
been caused by the government’s overcommitment in the past.’ 
If the net pension debt continues to expand, the pension fund will eventually 
be bankrupt. However, even if the balance of the pension fund becomes nega- 
tive temporarily, the public pension system will be financially healthy as long 
as a permanent expansion of the net pension debt is prevented. 
In this paper, we estimate the net pension debt of the Japanese government 
that existed in 1990 and predict its future fluctuations under the contribution 
and benefit schedules set by the government’s 1994 Pension Reform Plan.*  This 
analysis will reveal the following: 
1. The net pension debt in  1990 was 578 trillion yen,  137 percent of the 
GDP for that year.3 
2.  The net pension debt will grow until the year 2045 then start to decline 
and become zero in the year 2090 (see fig. 14.4 below). 
3. The “excess fiscal burden”  for the pension  system-that  is, the fiscal 
burden that exceeds the actuarially fair contributions-will  be spread unevenly 
over years, peaking at 3.0 percent of GDP in the year 2020 and dropping to 
less than 1 percent after the year 2080 (see fig. 14.5 below). 
These findings show that the most serious problem of the Japanese pension 
system is not its financial health, but the uneven distribution of the excess fiscal 
burden across generations. 
The paper also considers the effects of  the Pension Reform Plan, which 
maintains the excess fiscal burden at 1 percent of  GDP throughout the fore- 
casted period. We show that this reform not only will make the intergenera- 
tional distribution of the excess burden uniform but also will give a sufficient 
fiscal infusion to make the system fully funded in the year 2155. 
Section 14.2 explains the various concepts used in the estimation of the net 
1. Under a pure pay-as-you-go system, there is no accumulation of the pension fund, and hence 
the pension debt itself is equal to the net pension debt. The debt is mainly caused by the fact that 
the first generation of the pension system received benefits without paying any contributions. 
2. The estimates given in the present paper differ from those given in Hatta and Oguchi (1993). 
First, we include the Public Sector Employee Pension in our estimation. Second, our estimates 
here are based on the benefit and contribution schedule of the government’s 1994 Pension Reform 
Plan, while the estimates in the 1993 paper were based on the schedule of the 1986 Fiscal Reap- 
praisal. Third, the estimates in the present paper are based on 1991 population projections by the 
Ministry of  Welfare, while the estimates in the 1993 paper were based on 1986 population projec- 
tions. A detailed explanation of the differences between the two estimates is available on request. 
3. This value is fairly close to Oshima’s (1981) hack-of-the-envelope estimate of 460 trillion 
yen. Note, however, that Oshima’s estimate was for 1981 and that the pension system was restruc- 
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pension debt. Section 14.3 presents the estimated values of  the net pension 
debts for each of the Japanese public pension systems. Section 14.4 discusses 
how the net pension debt will grow in the future. Section 14.5 focuses on the 
excess fiscal burden as a determinant of the growth of the net pension debt. 
Section  14.6 discusses the economic impacts of  the Pension Reform Plan, 
which maintains the excess fiscal burden at  1 percent of GDP. Section 14.7 
runs  a few sensitivity analyses, and section  14.8 contains some concluding 
remarks. The appendix discusses the meaning of the net pension debt. 
14.2  Estimation Method of the Net Pension Debt 
To calculate the net pension debt at a given point in time, the full fund must 
be known. The full fund is the sum of the pension debts to all living genera- 
tions. We  first discuss the procedure for estimating the pension debt to the 
working generations. In section 14.2.4 we discuss the debt to retired genera- 
tions. 
14.2.1  Lifetime Pension Contribution 
The sum of the present values of the contributions a person made in the past 
is called the “past contribution.” The sum of the present values of his or her 
expected contributions is called the “future contribution.” The sum of the past 
contribution and the future contribution is called the “lifetime contribution.” 
Thus, 
(2)  Lifetime contribution = Past contribution + Future contribution. 
A person’s lifetime contribution is the present value of  the pension contribu- 
tions to be paid throughout his or her lifetime. The person’s past and future 
contribution profiles can be estimated based on his or her wage profile. 
14.2.2  Pension Wealth 
We  define an individual’s “lifetime benefit” as the present value of his or 
her expected benefits under the present pension system from the beginning of 
retirement to the end of his or her life. This is shown by the fine dashed line in 
figure 14.1. If a pension system is fully funded, the lifetime benefit should be 
the same as the lifetime contribution as calculated above. Under a pension 
system that is not fully funded, these two values are not the same. 
We define the “pension wealth” of an individual as the present value of his 
or her expected benefits from a given moment in time to the end of his or her 
life. This is shown by the heavy dotted line in figure 14.1. For a person who is 
still working, pension wealth is equal to lifetime benefit, as figure 14.1 shows. 
14.2.3 
We divide pension wealth into two parts: the portion corresponding to the 
past contribution and the portion corresponding to the future contribution. The 
Promised Benefit and To-Be-Earned Benefit 336  Tatsuo Hatta and Noriyoshi Oguchi 
To-be-earned 
Pension debt  Pension debt 
(=promised  (=promised 
benefit)  benefit) 
v  v 
0  65 years old  age 
Lifetime  Pension -  Pension debt 
benefit  wealth  (=promised benefit)  _____ 
Fig. 14.1  Lifetime benefit, pension wealth, and pension debt 
former is called the “promised benefit,” and the latter the “to-be-earned bene- 
fit.” Thus, 
(3)  Pension wealth = Promised benefit + To-be-earned benefit. 
(Pension debt) 
II 
The solid line in figure 14.1 depicts the promised benefit. The to-be-earned 
benefit is shown as the vertical distance between pension wealth and promised 
benefit. It is positive only for people under age 65. 
In practice, there are various ways of  calculating the promised benefit and 
the to-be-earned benefit. In this paper, we  simply divide pension wealth in 
proportion to the two terms in equation (2)  to obtain the estimates of the two 
terms in equation (3).4 
If  a pension system is fully funded, the promised benefit in equation (3) 
must be equal to the past contribution in equation (2).  Everybody must have 
accumulated contributions exactly equal to the promised benefit. 
If a system is not fully funded, these two terms are not necessarily the same. 
For example, the promised benefit exceeds the past contribution for a person 
older than age 50 in the Japanese Private Sector Employee Pension. This per- 
son receives a net transfer of income from the government based on his or her 
past contribution. For a person under 30 years of age, the promised benefit is 
4. This implies that the following holds: 
Lifetime contribution : Pension wealth = Past contribution : Promised benefit 337  The Net Pension Debt of the Japanese Government 
Promised Benefit = Pension Debt 
(present value of benefit attributable 
to the past contribution) 
1. Transfer on the 
Past Contribution  Past Contribution 
Table 14.1  Division of Pension Wealth of Working Generations 
To-Be-Earned Benefit 
(present value of benefit attributable 
to the future contribution) 
Future  2. Transfer on the 
Contribution  Future Contribution 
Pension Wealth (present value of benefits to be received) 
less than the past contribution (see, e.g., Takayama 1981; Oguchi, Kimura, and 
Hatta 1993). 
The second line of table 14.1 shows the decomposition of  pension wealth 
by  equation (3), and the bottom line shows the decomposition by equation (2). 
The difference between the first terms on the right-hand sides of equations (2) 
and (3) is the transfer income one receives from the government based on one’s 
past contribution. This is represented by  item 1. The difference between the 
second terms of those equations is the transfer income based on one’s future 
contribution. This is represented by item 2. If  the future contribution is larger 
than the to-be-earned benefit, item 2 becomes negative; its absolute value is 
called the “excess contribution.” 
14.2.4 
Pension wealth represents the present value of expected future benefits. For 
retired generations, the annual benefit is already determined. Therefore, pen- 
sion wealth is simply the properly discounted product of the annual benefit and 
the expected number of years retirees will receive this benefit. 
Pension Wealth of Retired Generations 
Regardless of a person’s age, the following equation holds true: 
(4)  Lifetime benefit = Received benefit + Pension wealth. 
The received benefit is the present value of the benefit received in the past. For 
working generations, the received benefit is nil and pension wealth is the life- 
time benefit. For retired generations, pension wealth is less than the lifetime 
benefit. This relationship is shown in figure 14.1  .5 
For the retired generations, the to-be-earned benefit in equation (3) is nil, 
and hence pension wealth is equal to the promised benefit. 
5. For working generations, the following inequality holds: Lifetime benefit > Pension debt. 
The lifetime benefit is necessarily equal to pension wealth, and as table 14.1 shows, pension wealth 
is greater than the pension debt of the government to these generations. 
The inequality holds for retired generations as well. For them, the lifetime benefit is greater 
than pension wealth, and pension wealth is equal to pension debt. 
In  sum, only for those who have just retired and are about to receive benefits is the lifetime 
benefit equal to pension  debt. That is, for an individual, the pension  debt by  the government 
reaches the maximum on his or  her retirement, and the maximum value is equal to the lifetime 
benefit. The relationship among these concepts is shown in fig. 14.1. 338  Tatsuo Hatta and Noriyoshi Oguchi 
14.2.5  Net Pension Debt 
The promised benefit is that part of pension wealth attributable to the past 
contribution. Hence, it may be considered to have been “promised” by the gov- 
ernment. In other words, for the government the promised benefit is the payable 
pension debt. Therefore, the above discussion holds, with the term “promised 
benefit” replaced by the term “pension debt.” For retired people, the pension 
debt of the government is equal to pension wealth. This is shown by the solid 
line and the heavy dotted line in figure 14.1. 
The sum of the pension debt over all participants is the full fund.6  The differ- 
ence between the full fund and the actual fund is the net pension debt. 
14.3  Estimation of the Net Pension Debt as of  1990 
In this section, we estimate the net pension debt as of  1990 as described in 
the previous section. 
14.3.1  Assumptions for Estimation 
In  estimation, we  followed the government’s 1994 Pension Reform Plan 
(hereafter called the “Reform Plan”) for assumptions regarding economic pa- 
rameters, benefit and contribution schedules, and population projections. Spe- 
cifically, the economic parameters were set as follows: nominal interest rate 
5.5 percent, rate of nominal wage increase 4.0 percent, rate of increase in nom- 
inal basic consumption expenditure 4.0 percent, and inflation rate 2.0 percent. 
The population projection is the one published in 1991 by the Research Insti- 
tute of Population Problems of the Ministry of Welfare, which was based on 
the 1990 census. 
We  made our own estimation of  the following parameters: the number of 
participants and recipients of benefits of the pension system by  age group, and 
the lifetime wage profile of workers. These parameters were not given explic- 
itly in the reappraisal. 
The number of participants by age group in each pension system was esti- 
mated based on the data on participation rate by age group for 1985. The num- 
ber of  beneficiaries by  age group was estimated based on the data for 1988 
published in the Reform Plan. 
The lifetime wage profile was estimated from the data in the Wage Census, 
which includes cross-sectional wage data by age group. We created a lifetime 
profile by taking the wages for the same cohort from the series of censuses. 
The pension contribution and the benefits in the future are given in the Re- 
form Plan. Following the plan, we assumed that the wage-proportional part of 
the private and public sector employee pensions will continue to be paid from 
6. The full fund may be viewed as the “pension debt to the participants.” The net pension debt 
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Fig. 14.2  Pension debt as of 1990: case 1 
age 60, but the starting age of the fixed portion of the benefit (the basic benefit) 
will be gradually raised to age 65.  Also, the reference wage of the replacement 
ratio will be shifted from monthly average gross wage to monthly average take- 
home wage after taxes, pension contribution, and so on. 
14.3.2  Estimation Results 
Pension debt by age group as of 1990. Figure 14.2 depicts the estimated pen- 
sion debts owed to different age groups in 1990. The fine dotted line shows the 
People's  Pension, the solid line shows the Private Sector Employee Pension, 
and the dashed line shows the Public Sector Employee Pension. 
For the Private Sector Employee Pension, the largest pension debt is owed 
to the age group born in  1935 because the people in this age group are just 
starting to receive benefits. For this group, the lifetime benefit is the pension 
debt. The pension  debt is smaller for each of  the older groups because their 
life expectancies  are shorter.  For the People's  Pension,  the  pension  debt is 
largest for those born in 1930 because a smaller portion of the younger genera- 
tions receiving this pension is engaged in agriculture. 
For an age group born after 1935, the pension debt was estimated to be the 
product of its lifetime benefit and the ratio of its past contribution to its lifetime 
contribution, as explained in section  14.2. Figure  14.3 shows pension wealth 
(lifetime  benefit),  past contribution,  and lifetime contribution  for these age 
groups. 
There are two reasons for the smaller pension debt owed to the younger age 
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Table 14.2  Full Fund and Net Pension Debt as of 1990 (trillion yen) 
Pension  Full Fund  Actual Fund  Net Pension Debt 
Private Sector Employee Pension  387  77  310 
People’s Pension  133  4  129 
Public Sector Employee Pension  171  32  139 
Total  69  1  113  578 
Source; Authors’ calculations. 
tion to lifetime contribution, because the Contribution period is shorter. Sec- 
ond, as figure 14.3 shows, the lifetime benefit is smaller the younger the age 
group. This is due to the schedule, in which the replacement ratio is lower for 
younger generations. The full benefit of the Private Sector Employee Pension 
is about 69 percent of the lifetime average of standard monthly pay after taxes 
and social security contributions, of which 30 percent is the wage-proportional 
portion and 39 percent is the basic pension benefit (fixed) portion. The wage- 
proportional portion will decline in percentage as the deductions from wages 
increase when the pension contribution rate is raised. 
Netpension debt as of  1990. The first column of table 14.2 shows the pension 
debt (full fund) for the Private Sector Employee Pension, the People’s Pension, 
and the Public Sector Employee Pension at the end of  1990. The actual fund 
and net pension debt also are shown. 
As the table shows, the balance of  the full fund for all pensions was 691 
trillion yen, of  which 387 trillion yen  was  for the Private Sector Employee 341  The Net Pension Debt of the Japanese Government 
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Pension, 133 trillion yen for the People’s Pension, and 171 trillion yen for the 
Public Sector Employee Pension. The overall balance of the actual fund was 
11  3 trillion yen-77  trillion yen for the Private Sector Employee Pension, 4 
trillion yen for the People’s Pension, and 32 trillion yen for the Public Sector 
Employee Pension, resulting in an overall net pension debt of 578 trillion yen. 
14.4  Growth of the Net Pension Debt 
We now analyze the time path of the net pension debt after 1990. According 
to equation (I), the net pension debt is the difference between the full fund 
and the actual pension fund. Here we examine the time paths of the full fund, 
the actual pension fund, and the net pension debt. 
Forecast of the  fullfund. The dashed line in figure 14.4 shows the future time 
path of the full fund. First, it expands as the number of retired people increases. 
It reaches its peak in 2060 then starts to decline. 
Forecast of the actual  fund. The dotted line in figure 14.4 represents the balance 
of the actual fund. It starts with 113 trillion yen in the year 1990 and declines 
slightly until the year 2005. Then it starts to grow slowly and picks up speed 
after 2060. Thus the actual fund will not be depleted even during the period of 
rapid aging, as long as the assumptions of the 1994 Reform Plan are reali~ed.~ 
7.  The fund can be depleted if the assumptions are not realized. Raising the pension contribution 
rate and the income tax rate in early years will help reduce this possibility. See, e.g., Noguchi 
(1986), Ueda, Iwai, and Hashimoto (1987). and Ogura and Yamamoto (1993). 342  Tatsuo Hatta and Noriyoshi Oguchi 
Forecast of  the net pension debt. In view of equation (I), the net pension debt 
is equal to the vertical difference between the dotted line and the dashed line 
in figure  14.4. This difference is depicted by  the solid line in the figure. It 
grows until the year 2045. After its peak in 2045, it declines steadily and be- 
comes zero in 2090. Thus the public pension system can become fully funded 
in the year 2090. 
14.5  Excess Fiscal Burden 
In this section, we examine the determinants of the growth of the net pension 
debt. We first define the concept of the excess fiscal burden, then use this con- 
cept in explaining the growth of the net pension debt. 
14.5.1  Definition 
The revenue of a general pension fund consists of the following three ele- 
ments: 
Interest income from the balance of the fund 
Pension  contribution  (equivalent  to  the  Social  Security  tax  in  the 
United States) 
Subsidy from the general account 
The sum of the last two may be called the “revenue from outside the fund.” If 
this exceeds the actuarially fair level of the pension contribution, the difference 
is the fiscal burden for the pension beyond the actuarially fair contribution. We 
will call this difference the “excess fiscal burden”: 
(5)  Excess fiscal burden = Actual contribution 
-  Actuarially fair contribution 
+ Subsidy from the general account. 
In other words, the excess fiscal burden represents a net transfer that the work- 
ing generation in a given year makes to other generations. 
14.5.2  Interest on the Net Pension Debt 
The revenues of the pension fund under a fully funded system consist of 
the following: 
Interest income from the full fund 
Actuarially fair pension contribution 
These revenues will be used to maintain the actual fund at the level of the 
pension debt, and hence to keep the net pension debt at zero. 
Consider a reform of the current Japanese pension system that equates the 
pension contribution to the actuarially fair level and abolishes the subsidy. Un- 343  The Net Pension Debt of the Japanese Government 
der this reform, the net pension debt will continue to grow. The reason is that 
the interest income from the actual fund is much less than the interest income 
from the full fund. We  call this difference  the  “interest on the net  pension 
debt”: 
(6)  Interest on the net pension debt = Interest on the full fund 
-  Interest on the actual pension fund. 
The interest on the net pension debt represents the increase in the debt under 
this hypothetical reform. To keep the net pension debt from growing after this 
reform, revenues equal to the amount of the interest on the net pension debt 
must be infused into the pension fund. 
14.5.3  Determinants of the Net Pension Debt 
We can express the increase in the net pension debt ass 
(7)  A Net pension debt = Interest on the net pension debt 
-  Excess fiscal burden, 
where the interest on the net pension debt is as defined in equation (6). This 
equation shows that the change in the net pension debt is determined solely 
by the difference between the interest on the net pension debt and the excess 
fiscal burden. 
The solid line in figure 14.5 represents the interest on the net pension debt 
in the ratio to GDP.  (Throughout  this paper we assume that GDP grows 3.5 
percent per year, which is equal to the real interest rate.) Before the year 2020, 
when excess fiscal burden peaks, this interest far exceeds the excess fiscal bur- 
den shown by the dashed line. After this peak, the ratio of the excess fiscal 
burden  to  GDP declines  gradually  and falls below  1 percent  after the  year 
2080. Thus this figure indicates the unequal burdens borne by different genera- 
tions. 
Figure 14.6  directly shows the unequal burden and benefit of the public pen- 
8. Since the net pension debt is the difference between the full fund and the actual fund, we have 
(*) 
The two terms on the right-hand side can be rewritten as follows: 
A  Full fund = Interest incurred on balance of full fund 
A  Actual fund = Interest incurred on balance of actual fund 
A Net pension debt = A Full fund -  A Actual fund. 
+ Actuarially fair pension contribution -  Benefit payment, 
+ Subsidy from general account + Actual pension contribution -  Benefit payment. 
Substitution of  these two relations into eq. (*) gives: 
A Net pension debt = (Interest on full fund -  Interest on actual fund) 
- (Actual contribution -  Actuarially fair contribution 
+ Subsidy from general account) 
This immediately yields eq. (7) 344  Tatsuo Hatta and Noriyoshi Oguchi 
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Fig. 14.5  Ratio of debt interest, excess fiscal burden, and excess contribution to 
GDP 
sion system by  generation. The lifetime contribution rate, represented by  the 
solid line, rises from below 10 percent for the generation born in 1935 to above 
20 percent for the generation born in  1970. In contrast, the lifetime benefit 
rate, shown by the dashed line, declines from nearly 20 percent to below 15 
percent. These two lines cross for the generation born in 1950; for those born 
after 1950, the pension contribution exceeds the benefits, and the difference 
becomes larger for younger generations. 
14.5.4  Policy Instruments 
We  now break down the excess fiscal burden into two terms: 
(8)  Excess fiscal burden = Excess contribution 
+ Subsidy from the general account, 
where 
Excess contribution = Actual contribution -  Actuarially fair contribution. 
The “excess contribution” is the portion of the actual contribution in excess of 
the actuarially fair amount. 
Let us now examine the future movement of the two terms on the right-hand 
side of equation (8). First, the time path of the excess contribution in its ratio 
to GDP is shown by the dashed line in figure 14.5. The excess contribution was 
-  1.7 trillion yen  in  1990. It  will increase over time and become positive 
around 2000. This upward trend of the excess contribution reflects the sched- 
uled increase in the pension contribution rate by  2.5 percent every five years 345  The Net Pension Debt of the Japanese Government 
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from  1995 to 2025, when it will be 29.6 per~ent.~  The fact that the excess 
contribution is negative now implies that working generations are making pen- 
sion contributions below the actuarially fair contribution. 
Second, the subsidy from the general budget account is found by the vertical 
difference between the dotted line and the dashed line in figure 14.5 because 
the excess fiscal burden, depicted by the dotted line, is the sum of the excess 
contribution and the subsidy from the general budget account. In the present 
system, one-third of the basic pension benefit is subsidized from the general 
budget account. This is the only subsidy from the general budget account. 
Figure 14.5 reveals that the main cause of  fluctuation in the excess fiscal 
burden is fluctuation in the excess contribution, rather than fluctuation in the 
subsidy from the general account. In particular, the negative excess contribu- 
tion at present is mainly responsible for the negative excess fiscal burden.'O 
9. The actuarially fair contribution is estimated to be about 14 percent after 2020 from an indi- 
vidual's wage profile and scheduled pension benefits. This is for private sector employees, assum- 
ing that they contribute for 40 years and receive benefits for 20 years. For public sector employees, 
the actuarially fair rate is about 3 percent higher. 
10. Suppose that the actual contribution  rate is raised to the actuarially fair level. Then the 
excess contribution will be zero, and hence eqs. (7) and (8) yield 
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Fig. 14.7  Excess fiscal burden of  1 percent of GDP and interest on net debt 
14.6  Pension Reform: Flattening the Excess Fiscal Burden 
Let us now consider a pension reform that maintains the excess fiscal burden 
at  1 percent of  GDP throughout the period considered. According to figure 
14.5, the ratio of  the excess fiscal burden to GDP will be  approximately 1 
percent in the year 2000. This reform assumes that the scheduled ratio for that 
year will be maintained throughout the period. Figures 14.7 and  14.8 depict 
the results of this reform," which will make the intergenerational distribution 
of the excess burden uniform once and for all. It will also eventually make the 
Japanese pension system fully funded. 
The solid line in figure 14.7, representing the interest on the net pension 
debt, reflects the shape of the net pension debt itself. This curve will intersect 
with that representing the excess fiscal burden when the burden reaches its 
peak in 2120. After that year, the excess fiscal burden will exceed the interest 
on the net pension debt. That is why the net pension debt will start to decline 
after this year. The solid line in figure 14.7 shows that it will reach zero in 
2155. As a result of this reform, therefore, the Japanese public pension system 
will become fully funded in 2155. 
The solid line in figure 14.8 shows that the ratio of  the net pension debt to 
GDP steadily declines until it reaches zero in the year 2155. Since the growth 
This implies that the net pension debt will continue to increase as long as the interest on the net 
pension debt is larger than the subsidy from the general account. 
Thus, even if the actual contribution rate had been actuarially fair since 1990, the net pension 
debt would have continued to grow, for fig. 14.5 indicates that the subsidy to the pension fund 
from the general account was much smaller than the interest on the net pension debt. See n. 13. 
11. The dotted line in fig.  14.8 shows that the ratio of the excess fiscal burden to GDP is  1 
percent. 347  The Net Pension Debt of the Japanese Government 
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Fig. 14.8  Ratio of excess fiscal burden of 1 percent and interest on net debt to 
GDP 
rate of GDP is the same as the interest rate on the net pension debt, as long as 
there is an infusion of excess fiscal burden to the pension account, the ratio of 
the net pension debt to GDP declines. The steady decline in figure 14.8 shows 
this relationship. 
Thus, if the percentage of the excess fiscal burden is maintained at 1 percent 
of GDP, not only can the intergenerational distribution of the excess fiscal bur- 
den be equalized, but also the growth of the net pension debt can be controlled. 
14.7  Sensitivity Analyses 
We conducted a few sensitivity analyses under the contribution and benefit 
schedules of the 1994 Reform Plan by changing the assumed economic condi- 
tions. First, we changed the assumed nominal interest rate from 5.5 percent to 
4 percent and called this case 2. In this case, the net pension debt was about 
870 trillion yen  as of  1990. This is larger than in the base case because the 
nominal interest rate is lower. The actual fund will also become negative for 
certain periods of time as a result of the lower interest rate; but it will start to 
grow again and eventually turn positive. Finally, the net pension debt will keep 
growing until 2115, after which time will decline and eventually reach zero in 
the second half of the twenty-first century. 
We also ran another simulation, assuming the same interest rate of 5.5 per- 
cent as in the base case but assuming that the growth of the wage rate and basic 
consumption will also be 5.5 percent. The qualitative nature of the solution in 
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14.8  Conclusion 
The net pension debt has been accumulated as a result of the pure income 
transfer to the first generation participating in the pension system. Hence, it 
may be repaid as the war debt was, being financed from the general account by 
many generations rather than from the pension account. 
The revenues of the pension fund from outside sources can be divided into 
two parts: the actuarially fair part and the excess fiscal burden. The magnitude 
of the latter determines whether the net pension debt will grow or decline. 
We  found that the ratio of the net pension debt to GDP will decline under 
the 1994 Reform Plan and will reach zero in the year 2090. Moreover, we 
found that the excess fiscal burden will be unevenly distributed across genera- 
tions and that of  current working generations is negative. These generations 
are not even paying the actuarially fair level of pension contribution. 
We  considered a pension reform plan that will maintain the percentage of 
excess fiscal burden at  1 percent of  GDP throughout the entire period. We 
found that this reform will not only equalize the burden across generations but 
also eventually make the Japanese pension system fully funded. This plan will 
reduce the fiscal burden of working generations during the early twenty-first 
century. 
Appendix 
The Net Pension Debt and Pension Reforms 
To  illustrate the meaning of  the net pension debt, we  examine how various 
hypothetical reforms of a pension system would affect this debt. 
The first reform is one that adjusts current and future contribution rates so 
that they will become actuarially fair to that part of the benefits that corre- 
sponds to these contributions.’*  The pension system after this reform will be 
called an “actuarially fair” system. 
If the current Japanese pension system is reformed to be an actuarially fair 
one, the contributions that flow into the pension fund account will be the same 
as under a fully funded system. An important revenue of a pension fund is the 
interest income that the fund itself yields. The actual pension fund, however, 
yields only a portion of the interest income that a full fund would yield since 
the balance of the former is lower than that of the latter. This means that even 
12. Note that even when contribution rates are reformed this way,  the present  values of  the 
lifetime contributions and the lifetime benefits are not equalized. In other words, this reform keeps 
the transfer payments corresponding to the past contributions as the vested interest of each genera- 
tion. See Hatta (1993). Hatta and Oguchi (1992), and Oguchi et al. (1993) on the actuarially fair 
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if our pension system is transformed to an actuarially fair one, the net pension 
debt may continue to rise and the actual pension fund may become delinquent 
sometime in the future.I3 
If a sufficient subsidy comes from the general budget every year, the expan- 
sion of the pension debt can be contained. We  call the interest that has to be 
paid on the net pension debt the “interest on the net pension debt.” If the sub- 
sidies from the general budget account equal the interest on the net pension 
debt every year, the balance of the net pension debt will be kept constant, and 
the balances of the full fund and the actual fund will fluctuate in parallel. An 
actuarially fair system accompanied by such subsidies from the general budget 
is called an “actuarially fair system in the narrow sense.” Under this system, 
the balance of  the pension fund will not decline endlessly. (In the text, the 
term “actuarially fair system” is used to mean that current and future pension 
contributions are related to the benefits attributable to those contributions in 
an actuarially fair manner, whether or not subsidies from the general budget 
account are taking place.) 
If  the subsidy from the general budget to the pension fund is greater than 
the interest on the net pension debt, the balance of the net pension debt will 
decline. If the balance of the net pension debt eventually disappears, it will be 
possible to switch to a fully funded system. Thus, it is useful to know the 
amount of interest on the net pension debt in designing pension reforms. To 
estimate the amount of  interest, we  need to estimate the amount of the net 
pension debt itself. 
The second reform we consider switches the current system to a fully funded 
system accompanied by an increase in the general tax to immediately establish 
a full fund. This reform consists of two components: switching to an actuari- 
ally fair system and raising tax revenues so as to equalize the actual pension 
fund and the full fund. In other words, current workers’ actuarially fair contri- 
butions will be accumulated to finance their own future benefits. This, how- 
ever, will deplete the source of benefits for retirees who are currently receiving 
benefit~.’~  This plan necessitates the immediate accumulation of the full fund 
by  means of an increase in revenues so that the benefit payments of both cur- 
rent and future retirees are guaranteed. 
To carry out this reform, current workers will have to pay this incremental 
tax in addition to the actuarially fair contributions for their own future benefits. 
13. Note that this means that the contribution rate will be raised now and reduced in the future. 
In the actual Japanese system, the general budget subsidizes a part of the benefits to the People’s 
Pension. The fact that this is sufficiently small is assumed. See n. 10. 
14. This eliminates the revenue source not only for the benefits of current retirees but  also for 
the  benefits corresponding to  the contributions that current workers have already made. This is 
because the contributions they have made have already been used for the benefits of current retir- 
ees. In the text, the phrase “the benefits of the first generation of  the pension system” is used to 
mean “the sum of (a) the  benefits of  current retirees and  (b) the benefits corresponding to  the 
contributions already made by current workers,” or equivalently “the pension benefits of the cur- 
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In other words, this generation will have to bear the burden for two generations. 
After this reform, the net  pension debt will become zero. The required 
amount of the incremental tax will be equal to the net pension debt immedi- 
ately prior to the reform. As we saw in section 14.3, this amount was equal to 
578 trillion yen in 1990. It is often said that once a pay-as-you-go system is 
established, it is difficult to return to a fully funded system. The estimate of 
the required tax for this reform shows that it is practically impossible to return 
to the fully funded system immediately by means of an increased tax. 
The third reform switches the current system to a fully funded one through 
the issuing of a public bond rather than raising taxes. The reform is a combina- 
tion of  a shift to an  actuarially fair system and the issuing of  a government 
bond in the amount equal to the net pension debt. We call the required govern- 
ment bond “the liquidation bond.” Is 
Immediately after the reform, the net pension debt will not be affected by 
the reform and will be equal to the amount of the liquidation bond issued. Let 
us assume that this bond is redeemed by  subsidies from the general budget 
financed by increased taxes over time. During the redemption period, the bal- 
ance of the liquidation bond will always equal the balance of the net pension 
debt. 
Under this reform, the government will simultaneously issue a public bond 
and increase the size of the pension fund. The former is the government debt 
to the private sector, while the latter is its loan to the private sector. This reform 
will not change the net pension debt position of the government in relation to 
the private sector. 
The first and third reforms are equivalent from the point of view of the gov- 
ernment’s indebtedness to the private sector, even though they are different 
reforms from an accounting point of  view. In particular, if, after the third re- 
form, the subsidy from the general budget to the pension fund were set exactly 
equal to the amount of the interest on the net pension debt, the balance of the 
liquidation bond would be kept constant over time. The pension system after 
this reform would be equivalent to the actuarially fair system in the narrow 
sense from the point of view of the government’s indebtedness to the private 
sector.lb 
15. See Hatta (1988) and Hatta and Oguchi (1992) for the liquidation bond. 
16.  We can interpret the current Japanese pension system as having already issued a government 
bond equivalent to the liquidation bond. 
Under the pay-as-you-go system, the contributions made by  working generations are not accu- 
mulated in the pension fund but are used to finance the benefits of current retirees in return for a 
government promise to current workers that the benefits will be paid to them in the future. This 
implies  that the government has issued IOUs to current working generations  in  return for the 
pension contributions they make. When these IOUs are  repaid in the future, new IOUs will be 
issued to younger generations to finance the repayment. The pay-as-you-go system can thus be 
viewed as a system that successively issues IOUs. The fact that the government issues IOUs in 
return  for pension  contributions  implies  that the government has been  issuing implicit  public 
bonds. The pay-as-you-go system continuously issues implicit public bonds, but with widely fluc- 351  The Net Pension Debt of the Japanese Government 
For the purpose of attaining long-run fiscal solvency of the pension system 
and of equalizing the fiscal burdens across different generations, it is not im- 
portant whether the system is reformed to a fully funded one or merely to an 
actuarially fair one. Regardless of the accounting appearance of the system, 
what really counts is the amount of additional tax revenues needed beyond the 
actuarially fair pension contributions. The strategic variables that need to be 
examined in any pension reform are the net pension debt and the interest that 
has to be paid on this debt. 
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Thus, switching to a fully funded system while issuing a liquidation bond is equivalent to stop- 
ping the issuance of new implicit bonds and making explicit the implicit bonds that have already 
been issued. Only by  making these implicit public bonds visible can the government establish a 
redemption plan that equalizes the burdens on  different generations. 